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nois in regard to the conflict between property rights and the police
power is the same as that of New Jersey. The court in Lasdon v. Halliban
said that while a person's business, profession or occupation is property
within the meaning of the due process clause, the power of the legislature
to interfere by passing laws for the preservation of good order or to pro-
mote public welfare and safety, or to prevent fraud, deceit, cheating and
imposition, has always been recognized in Illinois. 21
In Gadlin v. Auditor of Public Accounts, the court said:
Legislative determination that regulations are needful . . . in order to be im-
posed must bear some definite, substantial relation to the public health, safety
morals or public welfare. 22
The decision in the instant case will no doubt be of benefit and impor-
tance if the corresponding section of the Illinois statute23 is ever involved
in litigation. The final determination of the question, however, will lie in
the opinion of the court as to whether the regulation bears definite, sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or welfare. 24
21377 I11. 187, 36 N.E. 2d 227 (1941).
22414 111. 89, 95, 110 N.E. 2d 234, 237 (1953); cf. Hannifin Corp. v. Berwyn, 1 111.
2d 28, 115 N.E. 2d 315 (1953).
231 11. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 1111, § 73.8a.
24 Hannifin v. Berwyn, 1 111. 2d 28, 115 N.E. 2d 315 (1953); Gadlin v. Auitor of
Public Accounts, 414 I11. 89, 110 N.E. 2d 234 (1953); Lasdon v. Hallihan, 377 I11. 187,
36 N.E. 2d 227 (1941).
DIVORCE-ILLINOIS 60-DAY "COOLING-OFF" PERIOD
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
Plaintiff sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk
of court to receive and file a complaint for divorce without first filing a
praecipe for summons as required by the 1955 amendment to the Divorce
Act' which provides for a 60-day "cooling-off period" between service
of the summons and filing of the complaint, except in cases specifically
provided for.2 Plaintiff contended that the act was violative of due process,
in that it was vague, indefinite, and uncertain; that it contravened Art. VI,
sec. 29, of the Illinois constitution, which provides that "all laws relating
to courts shall be general, and of uniform operation;" and that it violated
Art. IV, sec. 22, of the Illinois constitution, which states: "The General
Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following
enumerated cases, that is to say: For-Granting divorces." The trial court
denied mandamus, and on direct appeal the Illinois Supreme Court held
I Ill. Rev. Star. (1955) c. 40, §§ 7a, 7b.
2 Ibid., at S 7c.
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unanimously that mandamus was properly denied. People ex rel. Doty v.
Connell, 9 111. 2d 390 (1956).
In disposing of the issues involved, Mr. Justice Hershey's opinion stated:
The "60-day cooling off period" provision is designed to effectuate a legis-
lative policy directed toward affording an opportunity for reconciliation of the
parties prior to hearing and decree. This court in previous decisions has recog-
nized the laudable purposes which are sought to be achieved by legislation of
this type. See, for example, People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 Ill. 2d 332,
346, 118 N.E. 2d 262.... The issue of due process of law is to be determined by
judging whether the particular statute is reasonable in the light of the legislative
objectives. (Cf. Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564.) So judged, we cannot say that
a post-jurisdictional delay of 60 days is unreasonable .... Under certain con-
ditions the 60-day waiting period may be waived, the law providing as follows:
"The court, in its discretion, may upon written motion supported by affidavit
setting forth facts showing that immediate relief is warranted or required to
protect the interest of any party or person who might be affected by a final
decree or order in the proceedings, grant leave to file or order the filing of a
complaint before the expiration of the 60-day period." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Chap. 40, par. 7c). 3
It was this provision in particular which plaintiff contended was so vague,
indefinite, and uncertain as to be violative of due process. The court
continued:
The exercise of discretion being such an essential part of the judicial process,
one can find numerous examples of provisions governing practice and procedure
which are analogous to the statute in question .... In effect the legislature has
done no more than confer upon the courts the necessary discretion to regulate
proceedings pending before them, similar to that exercised in a wide variety of
situations .... We conclude that this authority of the court to exercise judicial
discretion in determining whether the immediate filing of the complaint is war-
ranted or necessary, satisfied due process of law, and since all divorce litigants
are subject to its provisions it is not special legislation, violative of section 22 of
article IV'or section 29 of article VI of the Illinois constitution .... 4
This decision crowns with victory the determined, concerted effort of
a group of members of the Illinois bench and bar who, since 1947 or
earlier, have sought to modernize Illinois divorce procedure to make it
better able to cope with the progressively worsening break-down of fam-
ily life they found developing around them in their day to day practice.
The first attempt in the current series was the Domestic Relations Act
of 1947 which sought to set up in all counties of over 500,000 population
(i.e., Cook County) a special divorce division to which all cases of divorce,
annulment and separate maintenance "tnay" be referred.5 This act also pro-
a People ex rel. Doty v. Connell, 9 Ill. 2d 390 (1956).
4 Ibid., at 397.
5 Il. Rev. Stat. (1947), c. 40, c. 37 5 105.1-105.18.
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vided that in these actions wherein the rights of minor children were in-
volved, court files were to be impounded for at least 30 days after the
filing of the complaint.6 The act was held to contravene Art. IV, sec. 22
of the Illinois constitution in Hunt v. County of Cook 7 but the main
points sought were clearly visible and have finally been achieved. They
are, first, a "cooling-off period" during which an attempt may be made at
reconciliation, before the acrimony, mutual recrimination, and public air-
ing of dirty linen entailed in a divorce action, and second, a type of
machinery for effectuating a reconciliation.
The second tack taken was an attempt, through petition, to have the
Illinois Supreme Court supply the desiderata outlined above through a
rule which would have provided for the filing of a declaration of inten-
tion to file a complaint for divorce, which declaration would have had
to precede by at least 60 days the actual filing of the complaint, and by
at least 90 days any final decree.8 Included in the proposed rule was a pro-
vision under which the judge could have invited the prospective parties to
confer with him in his chambers. No testimony was to be taken nor any
record made of the statements of the participants in the voluntary con-
ference. Again we see the same two points emerge: the cooling-off period
and the machinery for effectuating a reconciliation. The court however
felt this to be a matter in the province of the legislature, and the second
phase of the battle ended.
Phase three opened in 1953 with the passing by the legislature of the
Divorce Act of 1953, 9 which embodied essentially the same provisions as
the rule proposed to the Supreme Court in 1949, and which, in addition,
provided for the appointment of aids to the courts to assist in matters per-
taining to divorce, annulment and separate maintenance actions. The
compliance of this act with the Illinois constitution was tried, and found
wanting, in People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell.10 The court said:
It is suggested ... that this statute may be sustained as merely creating a pro-
cedural step which it is reasonable to require as an incident to the administra-
tion of justice .... [T]his law could be sustained as a rule of procedure only if
the procedure sought to be established applied uniformly to all cases. The legis-
lature has no more power to discourage the filing of divorce cases by postponing
the right of access to the courts than it would have to discourage actions for
personal injury by similar measures. To hold otherwise would be a denial of
that equal protection of the law to which every person is entitled.'1
6 Ibid., ate. 37, S 105.10. 7 398 111. 412, 76 N.E. 2d 48 (1947).
8 Petition for the Adoption of a Rule Relative to Divorce, Separate Maintenance and
Annulment Proceedings, presented to the Supreme Court of Illinois in January Term,
1949, by the Illinois State Bar Association, The Chicago Bar Association, and the
Honorable Julius H. Miner, Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
9 I11. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 40, S§ 7a-7c, 23-29.
10 2 Ill. 2d 332, 118 N.E. 2d 262 (1954). 11 Ibid., at 346 and 269,
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The particular provision of the Illinois constitution which the 1953 act
was held to contravene was Art. II, sec. 19, which provides:
Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation; he ought
to obtain, by law, right and justice freely, and without being obliged to pur-
chase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay.
The court also held that the pre-trial conference provided for by the act
would have required the judge to perform non-judicial functions.12 In
this connection, it is worthy of note that, although the Christiansen case
did not attack those provisions of the 1953 act relating to the appointment
of administrative aids to the courts, these provisions were changed in the
1955 act. 13 The changes made purport to allow for the handling by these
aids of "such non-judicial duties with respect to proceedings for divorce
and separate maintenance and matters ancillary thereto as the court shall
direct."14
Against this sketchy historical back-drop the legal reasoning behind
the Divorce Act of 1955 becomes clear. The action is commenced by
filing a praecipe for summons with the clerk of the court.' Thus, im-
mediate access to the courts may be had; there is no delay. The much
fought for cooling-off period comes after both parties are subject to the
jurisdiction of the court and may be exposed, at least, to the reconciliation
machinery provided.' 6 If it is necessary, in the light of the Hunt and
Christiansen cases, that this reconciliation machinery be not spelled out
in detail in the act, it also seems wiser that this be so. The individual
judges are left freer thereby to experiment and to improvise as the exigen-
cies of the particular case before them seem to demand.
A brief glance at attempts that have been made in sister states to deal
with a mounting number of divorces confirms the initially favorable im-
pression of this statute. Two main approaches to the problem of recon-
ciliation may be distinguished in those states which have legislated on the
matter. One group of states places restrictions on remarriage on one or
both parties to a divorce action.' 7 These statutes range from the absolute
prohibition of remarriage by the guilty party in certain divorce actions
(e.g., where the ground is adultery), which statutes seemed to be aimed
primarily at the prevention of subsequent remarriages by parties con-
sidered unfit to marry,' through decrees nisi or interlocutory decrees,
12 Ibid.
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 40, §§ 30, 31, 32. 15 Ibid., at § 7a.
14 Ibid., at S 31. 16 Ibid., at S 7b.
17An exhaustive collection of cases and analysis of this group may be found in
36 Va. L.R. 665 (1950).
Is Note in this connection, the statement of the court in Swinehart v. Bamberger,
166 Misc. 256, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 130, 135 (S.Ct., 1937): "The statute goes beyond the pre-
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which provide a period during which reconciliation is possible, to statutes
which provide for the issuance of absolute decrees without any interven-
ing time lapse, but forbid the remarriage of the parties either for a speci-
fied period of time or at the discretion of the court.
Of this group, it may be remarked generally that, while it may indeed
prevent hasty remarriages by those who already have been through one
divorce, and thus save them from a second trip through the divorce courts,
it would seem to accomplish little in the way of reconciliation of parties
on the verge of a divorce. Experience would lead us to discount whatever
deterrent effect on divorces this group of statutes might seem to create.
The second broad grouping of jurisdictions, into which Illinois now
settles by virtue of the decision in the Doty case, are those in which op-
portunity (at least) for reconciliation is offered before the parties have
reached the point of no return in a divorce action, by providing for a
cooling-off period either before an action may be filed, 19 or after the
commencement of an action but before the parties find themselves face
to face in the divorce court, calling names and telling tales and airing the
pent-up grievances which, once uttered, become so irretrievably final. It
will readily be observed that, at least where there is a chance for reconcili-
ation, this latter group of states provides an opportunity for the court to
do all it can before the rupture of the marital relationship becomes a fait
accompli.
In declaring constitutional the Divorce Act of 1955, the Illinois Supreme
Court has placed the state in the forefront of those seeking, by appropriate
legislation, to cut down somehow the appalling divorce rate and its con-
stellar problems of broken homes, broken lives, juvenile delinquency, and
the like. In providing for a 60-day cooling off period before a complaint
may be filed, and before a decree can issue in the cause the act provides
the opportunity, and by its provisions for administrative assistants to
judges in divorce matters the machinery for reclaiming those marriages
which can yet be saved.
vention of hasty divorces secured because of a desire to remarry immediately, and
beyond the mere will to punish the guilty party. It aims to protect the marital status
by ascertaining to some extent the fitness of those seeking to re-enter the marriage
state after violating its precepts ......
19 No. Car. Gen. Stat. (1951) c. 50, §§50-58; N.J. Stat. Ann. c. 50 § 2:50-2, as
amended, L. 1948, c. 320, p. 1284, S (in cases of extreme cruelty).
FAIR TRADE-MANUFACTURER-WHOLESALER MAY NOT
FIX PRICES WITH COMPETING WHOLESALERS
McKesson and Robbins, Inc., sold drugstore merchandise of various
brands throughout the country, and also manufactured its own brand of
drugstore products. The manufacturing division of the company main-
